Databases "sui generis" right: should we adopt the spin-off theory? by Derclaye, Estelle
 1 
FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY 
E.I.P.R. 2004, 26(9), 402-413 
 
European Intellectual Property Review 
 
2004 
 
Article 
 
DATABASES SUI GENERIS RIGHT: SHOULD WE ADOPT THE SPIN OFF 
THEORY 
 
Estelle Derclaye. 
 
 
Copyright (c) 2004 Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 
Cases: Nederlandse Omroep Stichting v Holdingmaatschappij de Telegraaf NV 
[2002] E.C.D.R. 8 (Hof (Den Haag)) (Netherlands) 
 
Nederlandse Vereniging van Makelaars in Onroerende Goederen en 
Vastgoeddeskundigen NVM v Holdingmaatschappij De Telegraaf NV (El Cheapo.nl) 
(Unreported, March 22, 2002) (HR (NL)) 
 
Wegener CS v Hunter Select BV (Unreported, November 27, 2002) (Hof (NL)) 
 
Societe Tigest Sarl v Societe Reed Expositions France (formerly Groupe Miller 
Freeman) [2002] E.C.C. 29 (C d'A (Paris)) (France) 
 
Fixtures Marketing Ltd v AB Svenska Spel (C-338/02) (Notice of ECJ Reference) 
[2003] E.C.D.R. CN2 (HD (Swe)) 
 
Algemeen Dagblad BV v Eureka Internetdiensten (Kranten.com) [2002] E.C.D.R. 1 
(RB (Rotterdam)) (Netherlands) 
 
Groupe Miller Freeman v SA Tigest Communication (Unreported, September 12, 
2001) (C d'A (Paris)) (France) 
 
Fixtures Marketing Ltd v OY Veikkaus AB (Unreported, February 1, 2002) (Finland) 
 
Legislation: European Parliament and Council Directive 96/9 on the legal protection 
of databases Art.7(1) 
 
Subject: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. Other related subjects: Information 
technology 
 
Keywords: Database right; EC law; Netherlands 
 
Abstract: Discusses whether databases created as a by product of the maker's main 
activity should be excluded from the protection of database right. Examines the 
requirement that database makers must show substantial investment in the database to 
 2 
qualify for database right under European Parliament and Council Directive 96/9 (the 
Database Directive) Art.7. Reviews Netherlands case law, comparing cases from 
other Member States. Considers the justification for allowing protection in return for 
substantial investment where the database maker has invested not only in creating the 
data but also in presenting it in a user friendly format, and how the principle might 
apply to telephone directories, sports information providers and scientific research. 
 
 
*402 Eight years have passed since the Database Directive was enacted. [FN1] A 
relatively abundant body of case law [FN2] has now emerged but courts remain 
divided or uncertain over a number of issues. One of them is the most important 
question of the protection requirement, the substantial investment. [FN3] In order to 
protect its database, the database maker must show "that there has been qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or 
presentation of the contents" (Art.7.1 of the Directive). 
 
In this respect, one crucial question has puzzled the courts--whether so called "spin-
off" databases can also benefit from sui generis right protection. Spin-off databases 
are collections of data which are by-products ("spin-offs") of a main or other activity 
of the producer [FN4] (such as event schedules, television or radio programmes, train 
and plane timetables, telephone subscriber data, stock prices, football or horseracing 
fixtures, [FN5] scientific data resulting from research or experimentation, sports 
results [FN6]). As can readily be seen, this other or main activity is something other 
than the making of the database: it is programming television programmes, organising 
an event, discovering stars, etc. The question is: should these database producers 
nevertheless be able to claim that the investment made in organising the event, 
attributing a telephone number or a time to the departure of a plane--in short, in 
performing the main activity--counts towards making the database? Or on the 
contrary, do the words "obtaining, verifying or presenting" mean that the investment's 
aim must be to produce the database? In other words, "does the database right merely 
protect investments that are directly attributable to producing a database (the so-called 
'spin-off doctrine')?" [FN7] Several courts, unsure whether the Directive wished to 
protect such databases, have asked questions to the ECJ. [FN8] 
 
As can be readily appreciated, the application of the spin-off theory is crucial since it 
determines the scope of protection. The consequence of adopting the spin-off theory 
is a lesser protection or in other words a broader public domain. It has been argued 
that beyond advocating the application of the spin-off theory, if the sui generis right 
could subsist in novel data which cannot be obtained anywhere else, it would unduly 
restrict freedom of expression and information. [FN9] After having recalled the 
origins of the theory, this article will first review how the courts and the literature 
applied and reacted to the spin-off theory. Following this analysis, several types of 
data will be identified and the article will determine whether the spin-off doctrine 
should apply to any of those. 
 
 
Origins of the Spin-off Theory 
The so-called spin-off theory or doctrine most probably originates from the 
Netherlands. [FN10] During the legislative process preceding the implementation of 
the Directive into Dutch law, members of parliament asked the Ministry of Justice 
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whether certain databases could be protected. [FN11] The questions related to three 
imagined cases. In all three cases, the government answered that those databases were 
not protected by the sui generis right. [FN12] The first example was a database 
constituted by the list of the Dutch restaurants awarded a Michelin star. Since the 
investment is directed towards granting the stars and not towards collecting the details 
of the restaurants, such a list is not protected by the sui generis right. The second 
example related to a list of newly discovered stars. Again the investment is not 
directed towards making a list of new stars but at discovering them through a 
telescope or a journey in space. Finally, *403 television programmes are no more than 
a spin-off of the activity of scheduling programmes; they are not protected as a 
database. 
 
 
 
The Case Law 
 
 
 
It is no surprise that the case law on the spin-off doctrine is mainly found in the 
Netherlands. But the spin-off theory has also been discussed, directly or indirectly, in 
cases in the Nordic countries, France and the United Kingdom. 
 
The Dutch courts are split on whether by-products should be protected by the sui 
generis right. In several cases, the Dutch courts have validated the spin-off doctrine, 
stating that such databases have not required a substantial investment. Other courts 
have rejected the spin-off theory, holding that databases should be protected 
regardless of the fact they are by-products of another activity. 
 
In two cases concerning telephone directories made by the former Dutch 
telecommunications monopoly (KPN), the Dutch courts have rejected the spin-off 
theory. In Denda v KPN, which was decided before the adoption of the Database Act, 
the Court of Appeal of Arnhem held that the paper version of a telephone guide was 
the result of a substantial investment. [FN13] The reason is that the Directive does not 
make a distinction between the primary and secondary exploitation of databases. 
[FN14] The court of First Instance of Almelo con-firmed this ruling in a later decision 
on the merits. [FN15] There is no distinction between the subscriber data and the 
telephone directory deriving from it. Thus KPN's directory was the product of 
substantial investment. In the second case (KPN v XSO), the President of the Court of 
First Instance of The Hague held that KPN's telephone guide, which it 
commercialised on the internet, was protected. [FN16] In this case XSO was 
providing users with KPN's directory without referring users to KPN's website, 
therefore bypassing KPN's ads. For the court, the Dutch Database Act aims at 
protecting such investment notwithstanding the fact that KPN would have invested in 
the telephone guide even if such investment had not been awarded database 
protection. [FN17] Certain costs must always be made not only to present the 
database so that it can be searched by the public on the internet but also to keep it up 
to date. The court decided that the database was protected. On the other hand, the 
Dutch competition authority found there was no substantial investment in the 
publishing of KPN's telephone guide on CD. [FN18] 
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In a number of cases relating to programming data, news headlines and real estate 
information, the Dutch competition authority and the Dutch courts have applied the 
spin-off theory. In De Telegraaf v NOS, [FN19] De Telegraaf had copied program 
listings on which the NOS argued to hold copyright, and sui generis right, for 
publication in its weekly television guide. The Dutch competition authority found that 
there was no substantial investment in the making of television programmes by the 
Dutch public and commercial broadcasting organisations. [FN20] Programme 
schedules are by-products of the programme scheduling process. Therefore the 
broadcasters could not invoke database protection by the sui generis right since there 
was no substantial investment. [FN21] The case was also in parallel before the civil 
courts. The Court of Appeal of The Hague, applying the spin-off theory, held that the 
"broadcasters, whose primary task is to make radio and television programmes, 
cannot accomplish this task without collecting the data on the programmes and 
redacting the programme lists" and therefore "the mere editing/redacting of the 
programmes does not show a (specific) substantial investment in time, money or 
otherwise." [FN22] The Court of Appeal on this point specifically referred to the 
Ministry of Justice's statement in support of its findings. 
 
In the Kranten.com case, [FN23] a number of Dutch newspapers were suing 
Kranten.com, which provided a daily service of newspaper article headings by way of 
deep links to the newspapers websites. The newspapers argued that they had database 
rights in their headlines listed on their websites and that Kranten.com's deep *404 
linking was an infringement of the sui generis right in its database. The court held that 
a list of newspaper article headings on a website does not represent a substantial 
investment. The publishers' investment is directed towards the gathering of reports 
and articles to fill the newspapers. The headlines are invented and do not reflect a 
qualitative investment. In other words, the court does not expressly adopt the spin-off 
theory but it can be concluded from the judgment that the selection of articles and the 
drafting of the list of titles to be placed on the websites were a side issue of the 
business, i.e. publishing printed newspapers. [FN24] The activity did not involve a 
quantitative investment because the seven persons involved in making the website of 
those newspapers were considered numerically negligible compared to the total 
numbers of persons involved in the production of the printed newspapers. [FN25] 
 
The Dutch courts were later confronted with a case involving a website of real estate 
information. In NVM v De Telegraaf, the website "El Cheapo", maintained by De 
Telegraaf, browsed, among others, NVM's website, which contains 45,000 properties 
for sale and is continuously updated. El Cheapo's search results did reproduce the 
whole of the pages with the entire information which appeared on NVM's website (i.e. 
the picture of the property, the price, the address and type of property as well as the 
website it was originating from, i.e. NVM's website) and were copied and presented 
under El Cheapo's frame. NVM sued De Telegraaf for database right infringement. 
De Telegraaf disputed that the list of real estates properties for sale represented a 
substantial investment. The Court of First Instance regarded the collection and daily 
maintenance of the data as a quantitative substantial investment. [FN26] NVM had 
invested 24 million in software to update the contents of the database directly. El 
Cheapo was therefore infringing. The Court of Appeal of The Hague disagreed. 
[FN27] It referred to the Ministry of Justice's statement that there is no substantial 
investment if the data are a mere spin-off of the main activities of the producer. In this 
case NVM had previously set up the database for use in a network and the placing of 
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their database online was considered a spin-off of those previous investments. For the 
court, the investment in hardware was made for the database as existing in the internal 
network and did not count towards the web version of the database. Subsequently, the 
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) overruled the Court of Appeal's decision and held that 
the spin-off theory did not apply in that case. [FN28] The Supreme Court stated that 
the spinoff theory is irrelevant in this connection ("in dit verband"). It held that 
"neither the Directive nor the text of art.1, a, of the Database Act offers a starting 
point for the opinion that in case a database is used for several aims, for each of these 
aims a substantial investment specifically must be shown". [FN29] As Visser notes, in 
this case, we are not in a "spin-off situation". [FN30] In addition, the Supreme Court 
suggests that adopting the spin-off theory would lead to considerable difficulties to set 
boundaries. [FN31] How can a distinction be made between the substantial 
investment in creating the data on the one hand and in collecting, verifying and 
presenting them on the other? 
 
Some have argued that the Supreme Court has definitely rejected the spin-off theory. 
[FN32] However others disagree: the Supreme Court just held that the theory did not 
apply in this case but has not rejected its validity. [FN33] Thus, for them, the Supreme 
Court has not rejected the possibility that the required investment might be lacking if 
no substantial investment directed at the compilation of any database has taken place 
and a database is just a spin-off of another activity. This may, for instance, be the case 
with programming data. 
 
A later case has also dismissed the spin-off argument. In Wegener v Hunter Select, 
[FN34] Wegener, who published job ads, sued Hunter Select for having extracted and 
reutilised its ads. It lost in first instance. In appeal, the Court of Appeal of 
Leeuwarden held that Wegener had made a substantial investment in the presentation 
of the ads in the printed edition. The court was very short on the possible application 
of the spin-off doctrine. It rejected the spin-off argument developed by Hunter Select 
that there is no substantial investment because the production of a database of job ads 
is not the primary aim of the newspaper. Since there was substantial investment in the 
presentation of the ads, the court did not have to look whether there was a substantial 
investment in the obtaining of the data. 
 
What do other national courts think? In France, arguments close to the spin-off theory 
have been invoked by defendants. But the courts have not applied the theory; they 
have not even uttered the word. Rather they seem to implicitly reject it. In Groupe 
Miller Freeman v SA Tigest Communication, [FN35] the defendant Tigest claimed 
that Groupe Miller Freeman's databases (trade fairs *405 catalogues) were by-
products of the activity of organising fairs and could not therefore be protected by the 
sui generis right. The court held that even if the databases were by-products of the 
activity of organising fairs by the claimant, these data were still subject to a particular 
treatment by computer in order to be made available to the public and the investment 
corresponding to this treatment had to be taken into consideration. The court held that 
the constitution, verification and updating of the contents of the database of traders is 
a substantial investment in view of the number of traders for each fair and the need to 
update it each year. The claimant's database was therefore protected by the sui generis 
right. This case seems to acknowledge that although there cannot be an investment in 
collection or verification for spin-off databases, there can nevertheless be a substantial 
investment in presenting the data. 
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In appeal, the claimants argued that the databases were the result of commercial 
efforts to promote the fairs, the establishment of communication plans, the advertising 
made to provoke the participation of traders and that those efforts gave their content 
to the database. They justified the investments in personnel and computer services 
exclusively devoted to the databases by producing the employment contracts and the 
invoices of services from persons working full time on the constitution and 
verification of those bases. They argued that the databases are updated and verified 
constantly, through regular marketing phone calls. They also argued that they had 
made efforts in presenting and editing the catalogues. Even if the collection and 
classification of the data are used to make the fair succeed, they necessarily imply an 
investment, human as well as material, in constituting and verifying the database, 
which is substantial. Commentators have regretted that the Court of Appeal accepted 
that the investments in promoting the fairs, not in constituting the database, should be 
taken into consideration. The sui generis right should not subsist owing to investments 
which are not directly devoted to the constitution of the base. [FN36] Those 
commentators are therefore in favour of the spin-off doctrine without stating it 
expressly. 
 
The Court of Appeal of Paris expressed the same opinion in a subsequent case 
involving the same claimant and another defendant. [FN37] The computerised 
treatment, the constant verification and updating of the information which result from 
a daily intervention of persons who are occupied full time with the quality of files, 
necessitate financial, material and human investments which confer their substance to 
the databases. The investments were held substantial and the databases (catalogues) 
protected. The commercial efforts to promote the fairs, the establishment of 
communication plans, the advertisement made to provoke the participation of the 
traders, even if those are linked to the activity of organising fairs, participate directly 
and narrowly in the conception of the databases; it did not matter that their 
exploitation is undertaken in parallel with the fairs. This seems close to the implicit 
statement of the Hoge Raad in NVM v De Telegraaf that it is difficult to make a 
distinction between investments in creating and investments in presenting the data. A 
commentator remarked that this conclusion is understandable because without the 
commercial effort of promoting the fairs, the database would not exist at all; in other 
words, there would be no data in it. [FN38] The derived and accessory character of 
the activity is not antagonistic with the existence of a substantial investment as long as 
it is clearly identified and distinguished. [FN39] 
 
The courts of three Member States (the United Kingdom, Sweden and Finland 
[FN40]) have been confronted with the question of the application of the spinoff 
theory and have decided to stay proceedings and ask preliminary rulings to the ECJ. 
The answer which will be given by the ECJ will determine the validity or invalidity of 
the theory. 
 
The Swedish reference involves Fixtures Marketing Ltd v AB Svenska Spel. Fixtures 
Marketing sued Svenska Spel for having used English football fixtures lists for 
gambling purposes. Both the court of first instance (Gotland City Court) and the Svea 
court of appeal found there was no infringement on the basis that there had not been 
an extraction. The court of first instance recognised there was a substantial investment 
in making the fixtures lists and seemed to reject the spin-off doctrine by stating that it 
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was impossible to draw a line between a preparatory work and the compilation of the 
database itself. The case came to the Supreme Court, which referred questions to the 
ECJ. [FN41] The first question concerns the spin-off theory:  
 
"In assessing whether a database is the result of a 'substantial investment' within the 
meaning of Article 7(1) of ... the database directive can the maker of a database be 
credited with an investment primarily intended to create something which is 
independent of the database and which thus does not merely concern the 'obtaining, 
verification or presentation' of the contents of the database? If so, does it make any 
difference if the investment or part of it nevertheless constitutes a prerequisite for the 
database?"  
 
Svenska Spel contends that Fixtures Marketing's investment is primarily concerned 
with the drawing up of the fixture lists for the English and Scottish football leagues 
and not with the databases where the data are stored. Fixtures Marketing, for its part, 
argues that it is not *406 possible to distinguish the work for the purpose of planning 
the game and the purpose of drawing up the fixture lists. This question posed by the 
Swedish Supreme Court addresses directly the problem faced in the Construct Data 
Verlag case. Without the commercial effort of promoting the fairs, the database would 
not exist at all. Therefore should the investment in the primary activity to some extent 
count towards the constitution of the database? 
 
The second question also relates to the question of substantial investment. "Does a 
database enjoy protection under the database directive only in respect of activities 
covered by the objective of the database maker in creating the database?" Svenska 
Spel contends that Fixture Marketing's creation of the database is not intended to 
facilitate football pools and other gaming activities but that such activities are a by-
product of the purpose of the investment. Fixtures Marketing, on the other hand, 
argues that the purpose of the investment is irrelevant and disputes that the possibility 
of exploiting the database for football pools constitutes a by-product of the actual 
purpose of the investment in the database. 
 
In the Fixtures Marketing Ltd v OY Veikkaus Ab case, similarly to the Swedish case, 
the Finnish betting agency Veikkaus used information contained in fixtures listings of 
English Premier League football matches for its betting activities. Fixtures Marketing 
claimed that its list was the result of substantial investment and that Veikkaus had 
infringed its database right on it. Veikkaus counter-claimed that the list was a spin-off 
of activities unprotected by the sui generis right. The court of first instance of Vantaa 
stayed the proceedings in order to ask questions in this regard to the ECJ. [FN42] The 
relevant question is phrased as follows:  
 
"May the requirements in art. 7(1) of the Directive for a link between the investment 
and the making of the database be interpreted in the sense that the 'obtaining' referred 
to in art. 7(1) and the investment directed at it refers, in the present case, to 
investment which is directed at the determination of the dates of the matches and the 
match pairings themselves and, when the criterion for granting protection are [sic] 
appraised, and does the drawing up of the fixture list include investment which is not 
relevant [i.e. which cannot be taken into account when the criteria for protection 
under the sui generis right are being assessed]?" [FN43]  
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This question in substance asks whether the word "obtaining" also includes the pure 
creation of data. 
 
The question was answered negatively in the British Horseracing Board v William 
Hill case. [FN44] The court held that investments in creating data, i.e. generating data 
in order to organise an event (e.g. a horse race) are not protected by database right. 
[FN45] In the opinion of the court, this is confirmed by Art.7.4. The judge 
nonetheless held that the database was protected. This was because a lot of investment 
went at least into gathering (and also presumably in verifying [FN46] and presenting) 
the data. Nonetheless the judge noted that "in practice where one person both creates 
the underlying data and gathers it together, as BHB does, it may be difficult to draw a 
sharp line between the two activities". [FN47] In its reference for a preliminary ruling, 
[FN48] the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, like the Finnish court, asks what 
is meant by "obtaining" in Art.7(1) of the Directive. 
 
In conclusion, with respect to the Finnish, Swedish and British references, the ECJ 
will have to answer whether the cost of programming an event is to be taken into 
account as relevant investment or in other words, whether "obtaining" data includes 
creating data. 
 
 
 
The Doctrine 
 
 
 
A great number of commentators--mainly Dutch, [FN49] and this is hardly a surprise 
in view of the origins of the theory--are in favour of the application of the spin-off 
doctrine. [FN50] Every human activity produces information on the side. Does that 
mean that there should be a database right on it? As one commentator puts it [FN51]: 
should parliament acquire database right in the results of its daily voting? Football 
clubs in their football scores? A cricket player in his batting average? The stock 
exchange in its stock market prices? An astronomer in the co-ordinates of newly 
discovered stars? 
 
*407 Several arguments in favour of the spin-off doctrine can be put forward. [FN52] 
A first argument derives from the rationale of the Directive. The Directive's aim or 
rationale is to promote investment in databases, encourage the production and 
dissemination of databases. [FN53] The sui generis right is a right based on utilitarian 
reasoning. Thus there is no reason to protect databases deriving quasi-automatically 
from other activities. A second argument is that there must be a direct link between 
the investment and the resulting database. "For example it would be incorrect to 
impute the entire annual budget of the Reed Elsevier consortium to the costs of 
running its Lexis-Nexis database. The costs must be directly attributable to the 
database to qualify as relevant 'investment'." [FN54] A third argument is based on 
competition law. The costs incurred in performing the primary activity should be 
recouped with the same activity. Otherwise consumers would pay twice for the same 
data. [FN55] However, the same commentators believe that "undertakings should be 
free to cross-finance their various activities by using the profits made by selling the 
'spin-off' to lower the price of its [sic] primary service". [FN56] The fourth argument 
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is based on the wording of the Directive: the investment must be in obtaining, 
verifying or presenting the data. Obtaining means gathering, collecting the data and 
not inventing or creating the data from scratch. [FN57] Obtaining an object 
presupposes the prior existence of this object. [FN58] The fact that the Directive does 
not refer to creation or invention of data confirms a restrictive reading of the term 
"obtaining". Recital 19 supposedly also confirms that investment in generating 
database contents is not to be taken into account. [FN59] 
 
There are three main arguments against the spin-off theory. First, it is difficult to 
distinguish between creating and obtaining data. Many courts have noted this 
difficulty and have generally rejected the application of the theory for this reason. 
[FN60] For instance, is discovering a new star, planet or galaxy creating or obtaining? 
In addition, the Directive does not make a difference between obtaining and creating 
elements. [FN61] The second argument is constituted by the inclusion in the initial 
Directive proposal of a compulsory licence provision for sole source database 
producers. [FN62] Why did the original proposal include a compulsory licence 
provision if it is true that created data are not encompassed by the sui generis right? 
This provision was later withdrawn. The reason appears to be that the Magill case 
[FN63] was considered sufficient to regulate the problem of abuse of dominant 
position by sole source database makers. This must mean that the withdrawal of the 
provision does not change the fact that those producers of data are protected by the sui 
generis right. Also the majority of lobbyists for the Database Directive were 
producers of "created" data (e.g. horse racing organisations-- such as the French PMU 
whose members organise horse races--or stock markets). Why would they have 
lobbied so hard if they could not be protected? The reason for withdrawing the 
compulsory licence provision might very well be a result of this strong lobbying by 
those organisations. The reason can hardly be that there was no risk of abuses of 
dominant positions because those companies were not protected. Thirdly, one will 
remember that the sui generis right was enacted in reaction to the non-protection by 
copyright in most Member States of, mainly, telephone directories [FN64] (which are 
constituted of data deriving from the activity of attributing phone numbers and 
therefore are par excellence the example of a spin-off database). Why create this right 
if the makers of these directories cannot benefit from it? It would be ironic if the very 
object that one historically wished to protect would, by the application of the spin-off 
theory, not enjoy sui generis right protection. [FN65] 
 
 
 
Refining the Spin-off Theory: Differentiating between Several Types of Data 
 
 
 
But what is really the spin-off doctrine? And do we really need it? Instead of 
concentrating on this theory which is endorsed by one government and a few courts 
only, should we not just interpret the Directive itself to try and find a solution to the 
problem in question? The answers to these questions are as follows. 
 
The spin-off doctrine is the doctrine under which there should not be protection by the 
sui generis right for databases which are spin-offs or by-products of another *408 or 
main activity. The database right should only protect investments that are directly 
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attributable to producing a database. In other words, when someone creates data it 
must be with the only aim to make a database. The data must not be just the result of 
another activity. The question on the other hand is and remains in all situations 
whether there has been a "substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification 
or presentation of the contents" (Art.7.1 of the Directive). The argument that will be 
developed hereunder is that, if the Directive is correctly construed, the spin-off theory 
hardly needs to apply. 
 
Almost all the decisions reviewed above concern data which have been created by the 
claimant (telephone directories, newspaper headlines and broadly speaking "event 
data" (i.e. radio and television programmes, dates and places of football matches and 
of horse races as well as teams playing or horses running). The Directive states that 
the substantial investment must be in obtaining, verifying or presenting the data. The 
crux of the problem is the meaning of the term "obtaining". It is not clear whether the 
spin-off theory is based on the fact that "obtaining" data means only collecting or 
gathering them and not creating them. There appears that there is no more refined 
explanation of the spin-off theory than the one given above (i.e. that databases which 
are spin-offs or by-products of another main activity should not be protected). 
Actually it seems that the word "obtaining" is only one argument in favour of the 
doctrine's application and thus that the interpretation based on the word "obtaining" 
does not coincide with the underlying rationale for the theory. Rather the theory 
seems to sweep more broadly in the sense that if the data have been created but there 
has been a substantial investment in their presentation, the theory might nevertheless 
apply. [FN66] It is submitted that, in order to determine the cases in which the sui 
generis right accrues, a distinction must be made between several types of data and 
several types of situations in which a substantial investment is made. In light of this 
differentiation, the application of the second (broad) interpretation of the spin-off 
doctrine [FN67] can be reconsidered rather than what has been so far generally done, 
i.e. applying it indiscriminately and without really explaining why it should apply. 
[FN68] The fact that the theory seems to simply apply indiscriminately (because it 
appears broadly to mean that a database that is the by-product of a main activity is 
excluded from protection per se) and the related fact that there is no clear explanation 
to which data the theory applies makes its application uncertain and unworkable. This 
is why the theory must be refined or else totally abandoned. 
 
Data can be classified in four groups, the last three of which appear "problematic" in 
view of the Directive's requirements and more generally of intellectual property 
policy. First, there are pre-existing data, i.e. data collected from pre-existing sources 
(such as works fallen in the public domain, locations of monuments or restaurants in a 
town (e.g. compiled in guide books or maps), customer data). Secondly, there are 
created or invented data. This means data which do not exist before the constitution of 
the database but are created or invented from scratch by the database maker, thus by 
man. The third type consists of the same such created data, but which are also 
presented in a certain way. The fourth type is data which pre-exist in nature but are 
then collected and recorded. They are not arbitrarily invented or created by man but 
are simply naturally occurring and are recorded as such accurately by man (e.g. 
meteorological data, astronomical data and genomic data). Before examining the 
consequences of the nature of these four types of data, a type of database should be 
isolated for the character of its database maker. 
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"State" databases 
 
 
 
In cases where a particular database has been made by the state, or in any case 
financed by the state (be it a national or local entity, and be it parliament, executive or 
judiciary), because of the character of its producer, irrespective of the nature of the 
data, and notwithstanding that a substantial investment has been made in the 
obtaining, verification or presentation of the data, the database should not receive 
protection. The arguments are close to those underlying the spin-off theory. The 
investment has been recouped; in other words, one should not protect the same object 
twice. Since the taxpayer has already paid for the data, he or she should not pay a 
second time. A basis for this argument is not directly apparent in the Directive but it 
should nonetheless be adopted. As a matter of fact, the Directive requires a substantial 
investment. But there is no investment, a fortiori substantial investment in "state" 
databases, simply because the database has been financed by the taxpayers, and since 
no risk has been taken, no investment has thus been made. [FN69] This is not to say 
that state data, e.g. parliamentary proceedings, judgments, laws, etc., should not be 
protected if they are thereafter collected, verified or presented by a private entity and 
if such collection, verification or presentation results in a substantial investment. 
 
A specific case is when a database has been financed partly by the state and partly by 
a private entity. This should not create insuperable difficulties. A calculation of the 
respective amounts invested in the venture by both should be made and a conclusion 
thereafter drawn as to whether there remains a substantial investment by the private 
entity to qualify the database for protection. 
 
 
 
*409 "Collected" data 
 
 
 
In this case, a simple application of the Directive means that since the data have been 
collected and not simply created or invented, they qualify under the first possible 
object of investment, i.e. "obtaining". Obtaining equates with collecting, gathering. 
The data exist before the constitution of the database and are there for any-one to 
copy. The only remaining question is whether there is a substantial investment in this 
obtaining. What is a substantial investment is a separate question not analysed in 
detail here. [FN70] If there is a substantial investment in obtaining these data, the 
database right accrues. Since the collected data are reproduced, leaving the data in the 
public domain, there is no risk of monopolisation. Anyone who wishes to make a 
similar or identical database is free to do so by collecting the same data in the public 
domain him- or herself. 
 
 
 
"Created" or "invented" data 
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In the case of created or invented data (telephone subscriber data, event data, postal 
numbers attributed to towns and areas, ISBN numbers, etc.), the question is whether 
protection can accrue if there is only a substantial investment in the creation of the 
data. Whether the database is protected depends on the interpretation of the word 
"obtaining" in Art.7 of the Directive. If "obtaining" also means, and also includes, 
creating, then the database is protectable. But, as has been seen, the word "obtaining" 
does not equate with or include the notion of creation. [FN71] Thus a substantial 
investment in creating data will not qualify the database for protection and the spin-
off theory does not (need to) apply. Since the created data are not protectable, they are 
reproducible by anyone; there is no legal monopoly on them. Once the whole database 
is made available by its maker to the public, anyone can copy it freely. If this 
interpretation of the Directive is to be followed--and the author thinks it should--it 
means that, intuitively, the framers had felt that granting monopolies in created data, 
by definition sole source data (i.e. data available only from one source), was not 
recommended in view of the negative consequences absolute monopolies entail. 
 
If the opposite interpretation were nevertheless adopted, whereby obtaining would 
include creating, consequently if there is a substantial investment in creating data, the 
sui generis right would accrue. The question would therefore be whether such a result 
should "as a matter of principle", to use the words of a commentator [FN72] (in other 
words as a matter of policy), be favoured. This is where the spin-off theory enters into 
play. Since these data have been created for another purpose, and are the result of 
another activity, even if there is a substantial investment in obtaining (broadly 
construed) them, the theory advocates that the database should not be protected. The 
underlying rationale is that the investment has already been recouped thanks to the 
exploitation of the other activity. Consumers should not be asked to pay twice. 
However, another argument can be made: if the database is a spin-off database, if a 
fortiori there has been no investment in it, all the investment has gone into the main 
activity. Thus there cannot be in any case a substantial investment in creating the data 
alone. All the investment by definition goes into financing the main activity. It is thus 
submitted that the spin-off theory is not needed in this case. However, a contrary 
argument could be made that without the main activity the database would not exist, 
so that a part of the investment invested in the main activity must be apportioned to 
the database. In this case, the spin-off theory would apply. 
 
In conclusion, following either of those arguments, such databases of created data 
either will never be protected or should not as a matter of principle enjoy the sui 
generis right. 
 
 
 
"Created and presented" data 
 
 
 
In the case of data which are created and also presented, three situations can be 
distinguished. We presuppose that the restrictive meaning of "obtaining" is adopted. 
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In the first, there is no substantial investment in the presentation [FN73] of the data 
and hence there is no protection by the sui generis right. The question of the 
application of the spin-off theory does not arise. In the second, there is a substantial 
investment in the presentation of the created data and hence protection is possible. In 
the third, it is not possible to determine whether there has been a substantial 
investment in the presentation as such, i.e. the presentation has been done at the same 
time as the creation and therefore both activities are inseparable. 
 
The first situation does not require further discussion. In the second, two cases should 
be further distinguished. In the first case, the created data can be presented in many 
different useful ways. Hence, since many types of useful presentations are possible, 
competition is possible as the created data are not protectable. The case is therefore 
not problematic and the sui generis right should be able to accrue to those making the 
substantial investment in presenting the created data in various ways. In the second 
case, the presentation is the only one which is user-friendly, useful to the user. [FN74] 
Another presentation will not be commercially viable. The sui generis right, if 
granted, would protect the arrangement (otherwise unprotected by copyright because 
unoriginal) and since it cannot be rearranged in another useful way, the underlying 
data as well. Thus, since it is not commercially viable to rearrange the data in another 
way, there is a monopoly on the presentation and the underlying data. 
 
The second case, however, creates a monopoly in the data and the question is whether 
the spin-off doctrine should apply. In the case of an event (concert, horse *410 race, 
match, etc.), the main activity is to organise the event; the aim is not to create the data 
as such. The same is valid for radio and television schedules, train and plane 
timetables as well as for stock prices, telephone subscriber data and Michelin stars. 
The main activity is not to create data for their own sake but to attribute a price to a 
stock, a number to a person, or a star to a restaurant. In each case there is a de facto 
monopoly over the presentation of the created data (if it is the only presentation 
possible) and the data themselves. The sui generis right is an intellectual property 
right and is given in order to promote the development of databases. The rationale for 
the right is thus the incentive to invest in the making of databases. [FN75] But these 
databases are created despite an incentive. They would be created anyway, even if 
there were no protection available. However in this hypothesis, the database maker 
can prove a substantial investment in the presentation of the data. Should this 
substantial investment be rewarded in view of the fact that there is only one way of 
presenting the data usefully? The question is the balance that should be found 
between the just reward that should be given for presenting the data, a reward which 
is given in order to encourage this presentation, and, on the other hand, the public's 
interest in obtaining the data at the lowest cost possible. These two interests must be 
weighed before the application of the spin-off theory should be envisaged. Since there 
has been a substantial investment, it would be unfair to allow the public to get the 
presented data for free. The public has an interest in having the data presented to it in 
the most user-friendly way and such efforts should be rewarded. If they were not, the 
data would not be presented at all and the public would therefore not be able to 
benefit from them. However, since such data are not available elsewhere, the risk of 
abusing the monopoly automatically granted by the law is high. In such cases, the law 
(and preferably the statutory law) should provide for a compulsory or even a statutory 
licence in order to avoid both prohibitive prices and refusals to license. [FN76] The 
public should pay for the information (in other words, the database maker should be 
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rewarded for its presentation efforts) but only a fair and reasonable price. Thus the 
spin-off theory should not apply since it would have the consequence that the 
database maker is not protected at all. 
 
In any case, the cases where a database maker can claim a substantial investment in 
the presentation of the data they created themselves will be rare for three reasons. 
First, the created data will in many cases already be somewhat organised as a result of 
the main activity. Secondly, especially in the case of digitally created data, presenting 
the data in the most efficient way (e.g. alphabetically, as in the case of telephone 
subscriber data) will not result in a substantial investment. [FN77] Thirdly, in most 
cases, the substantial investment in presenting the data will coincide with the 
originality requirement in copyright law. Indeed, presentation can also be described, 
among others things, as the structure of the information. [FN78] Thus, if the structure 
is original, it is already protected by copyright and should not be protected by the sui 
generis right even if a substantial investment can be proven in the structure, the 
presentation, itself. In this case, again as a matter of policy, the same object (effort) 
should not be protected (rewarded) twice. [FN79] Thus the cases where the sui 
generis right would accrue are when there is a substantial investment which does not 
give rise to a copyright protected arrangement, and is more substantial than 
classifying data alphabetically or in a similar way. These cases, it is submitted, should 
be rather rare. 
 
In the third situation, it is not possible to determine whether there has been a 
substantial investment in the presentation as such, i.e. the presentation has been done 
at the same time as the creation and therefore both activities are inseparable. In other 
words, it is not possible to apportion a part of the substantial investment to the activity 
of presentation only. In this case, a substantial investment can be proven but it is not 
clear which part of it can be apportioned to the presentation of the data. Since the 
database maker cannot prove how much of the investment (i.e. a substantial 
investment) went into the presentation, as a matter of proof, he or she should not be 
benefit from protection. The Directive answers this question clearly in its Recital 54: 
"Whereas the burden of proof that the criteria exist for concluding that a substantial 
modification of the contents of a database is to be regarded as a substantial new 
investment lies with the maker of the database resulting from such investment". 
Arguably, a fortiori, this applies to the initial investment as well. Therefore, in those 
cases, the spin-off theory does not even have to apply: there is no protection simply 
because the substantial investment is not proven. As one commentator remarked, the 
fact that the data derive from a primary activity does not prevent the existence of a 
substantial investment as long as it is clearly identified and distinguished. [FN80] A 
contrario, therefore, if the substantial *411 investment cannot be clearly apportioned, 
the sui generis right should not arise. 
 
 
 
"Recorded" data 
 
 
 
The third type of data is data actually collected in nature by instruments of measure 
and recorded in intelligible form. In this sense, they can also be described as created 
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since they did not exist in intelligible form before. The difference from the other 
category of created data is that anyone can record them since they preexist in nature. 
They are not data arbitrarily created by man's brain. However, it is difficult to 
determine whether the data are actually created or only collected by man. Perhaps 
they are both collected and created. Despite this quasi-insoluble question, in many 
more cases it will be possible to claim that a substantial investment went into 
presenting these data in an intelligible form. Should the spin-off doctrine apply to 
those databases? The question is whether there is a primary activity distinct from a 
secondary activity. 
 
In the case of meteorological, astronomical and genomic data and more generally 
perhaps any scientific data, is the main activity to collect and present the data? Is the 
research behind mapping the human genome only aimed at collecting and presenting 
the information? Are the efforts in discovering new planets, comets, galaxies or stars 
aimed only at collecting this information (the fact that they exist)? Or on the contrary, 
is there rather a primary activity (trying to predict weather, to understand the 
functioning of the universe or of man, animals or plants, to perform experiences), the 
data which are generated being only a mere by-product of this primary activity? 
[FN81] These cases are not clear-cut. 
 
If the main activity is to present the data, the substantial investment is in collecting 
and presenting the data for themselves. Therefore the spin-off doctrine does not apply 
since there is no other activity with which the collector can recoup its investment. In 
addition, there is no policy argument which leans towards an application of the 
theory. There is no de facto monopoly possible (at least in theory) since anyone is free 
to collect these data. In practice, however, these kinds of data are costly to collect 
because the equipment needed is expensive and therefore there will be very few 
entities which can afford collecting the data. There is therefore a high barrier of entry 
and the risk of a natural monopoly is important. What then? It is submitted that 
protection should accrue. If the spin-off theory applied, there would be no incentive to 
create such important databases. The application of the spin-off theory is thus not 
justified and could even have the disastrous consequence that some databases would 
not be created at all for want of the possibility to recoup the huge investment which 
more than often needs to be invested in making those databases. However, as argued 
above, the potentiality of natural monopolies in the case of data that are extremely 
costly to collect is important, and abuse through either unreasonable prices or refusals 
to license is highly possible. The law (preferably the statutory law) should therefore 
provide for the possibility of a compulsory licence under certain conditions in case 
such abuse occurs. [FN82] 
 
If the main activity is not to present the data but to understand the functioning of 
nature, be it the universe or living beings, then it can be said that the data generated 
are a by-product of this main activity. In this case, the spin-off theory would apply. As 
has been seen, the theory should not apply indiscriminately, since there can be a 
substantial investment in presentation. If the database has been made by a private 
entity, [FN83] and substantial investment in presentation can be proven, [FN84] then 
a correct interpretation of the Directive entails that such databases should be 
protected. The aim of Directive is to provide an incentive in the making of databases. 
If the database maker knows that he will not be protected for presenting the data, he 
will not invest. The dilemma, however, is the same as for "created and presented 
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data": should those databases however deserve protection? Perhaps in more cases than 
for "created and presented" data, "recorded" data will be vital to society. The 
temptation is great to reject the protection of those databases en bloc, in other words 
to apply the spin-off theory. In the author's view, the same solution as for "created and 
presented" data is best. Governments do not have sufficient resources to make all 
scientific discoveries. This might have been the case in the past but not anymore. The 
aim of the Directive is to encourage the development of databases. If the state does 
not act and companies know that the results of their endeavours will not be protected, 
they will either not invest or will keep their (unpatentable) results for themselves if 
they can (as trade secrets). Thus, when one is confronted with the presentation of 
naturally occurring elements (such as the human genome) which require considerable 
sums, not easily available, and the data are vital to society, the enterprise making the 
investment should on the one hand be rewarded for its endeavours through protection 
but, on the other, should not prevent mankind from benefiting from it. The same 
balancing of interests as for "created and presented" data should be made. Both the 
risk of monopolising the information (through refusals to license or incredibly high 
prices) and the importance of its availability to humanity plead for the compromise 
solution of a compulsory licence, [FN85] preferably enshrined in the statutory *412 
law to enable a clear vision to all and thereby ensure legal security. 
 
In the other cases, where the investments in collecting the data are not so great, the 
risk of monopoly is much lower since the data is available for anyone to record. 
Therefore, a normal application of the database should be recommended. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
If the spin-off theory is equivalent to stating that databases of created data are not 
protected by the sui generis right, it is basically just interpreting the word "obtaining" 
in Art.7.1 of the Directive in the correct way. On the other hand, if the spin-off theory, 
as it seems to, refers to a broader meaning that any database which is a spin-off of 
another activity should not obtain protection, it goes too far. Especially in the case of 
"recorded" data, the application of the spin-off theory would have too far-reaching 
consequences which in some cases could even be disastrous. Arguably there are cases 
where spin-off databases should be granted protection, when a substantial investment 
in the presentation of the data can be proven. However, in some delimited cases (some 
"created and presented" data as well as some "recorded" data), the full effect of the 
Directive would give rise to absolute or natural monopolies. In those cases, a 
compromise solution would be to impose the licensing of the information at a 
reasonable price. In sum, we should not adopt the spin-off theory in its broader 
meaning. [FN86] A construction of the Directive as such is sufficient to bring a 
solution to the monopolistic situations created by some data identified above. 
 
The results of this analysis can be applied to the cases decided by national courts. In 
most of the cases decided, e.g. in the KPN cases, in Kranten.com, in De Telegraaf v 
NOS, the courts should have applied the above findings. These data were either just 
created or created and presented. If the courts did find the data was just created, they 
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were right not to grant protection at all. But if they had gone further in their analysis 
and had stated that the data were actually also presented, they should have verified 
whether there was a substantial investment in the presentation and continued the 
analysis. In general the courts' analysis was rather coarse; they applied the broader 
meaning of the spin-off theory indiscriminately. An exception is the BHB v William 
Hill case, where the court stated that the data were created but also gathered, verified 
and presented, and agreed that the claimant had proved a substantial investment in 
them. On the other hand, in NVM, the data (real estate ads) seemed collected rather 
than created and were also presented. The intuitive rejection of the spin-off theory and 
the subsequent result arrived at by the Hoge Raad are laudable, but for the wrong 
reasons. A simple application of the Directive (is there a substantial investment in the 
collection, verification or presentation of the ads?) would have allowed the court to 
draw conclusions rather easily. [FN87] A timid attempt to develop the argument put 
forward in this article can be found in the Wegener case, where the court refused to 
listen to the mermaids' songs of the spin-off theory and examined whether there was a 
substantial investment in the presentation of the data, irrespective of whether the data 
had been obtained or created. 
 
The four cases before the ECJ involve either "created" data or "created and presented 
data". The ECJ should direct national courts in the way advocated in this article. It 
should be able to do so since all the arguments developed above are purely based on 
the Directive. If the databases are made by the state, there is no protection. This, 
however, does not seem to be the case. If the data are only created, then the BHB and 
Fixtures Marketing databases are unprotected. If the data are both created and 
presented, first the database makers should prove there has been a substantial 
investment in the presentation of the data. If it is proven, then it should be seen 
whether this presentation is the only user-friendly, commercially viable, way to 
present the data. If it is, then protection should accrue but should be regulated by 
means of a compulsory or a statutory licence. If it is not, the normal effect of the 
Directive should be given. 
 
And to answer the rhetorical questions posed by one commentator [FN88]: 
parliaments should not have a database right in the results of their daily voting 
because the collection of those results is a state database. Football clubs should not 
have a database right in their football scores if they are purely created data. If they are 
created and presented data which are only presentable in one user-friendly way 
(which will be the most frequent case) and there is a substantial investment in this 
presentation (which on the other hand will be rare), protection should arise but be 
licensed by law at a reasonable price. Cricket players and stock markets should be 
treated in the same way. Finally, an astronomer should have a sui generis right in the 
co-ordinates of newly discovered stars, planets or galaxies. However, he should not 
refuse to license the data or demand an astronomic price for them. 
 
 
 
Post-Script 
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On June 8, 2004 the Advocate General ("A.G.") gave its Opinions in the four 
references for preliminary rulings. Due to the editing schedule of this article, it has not 
been possible to take them into account in the body of the text. In summary, the A.G. 
holds that the provisions of Directive are the decisive factor in its interpretation and 
that reliance on the spin-off theory should not result in the exclusion of every spin-off 
database. Later she rejects the spin-off theory in the sense that protection is also 
possible where the obtaining was initially for the purpose of an activity other than the 
creation of a database. The A.G. agrees that databases of purely created data are not 
protected by the sui generis right. Obtaining is to be interpreted narrowly (in the sense 
of *413 collecting, gathering, thus excluding generating data). It presupposes the pre-
existence of the data. However the A.G. also points out that in many instances of a 
database maker both creating and collecting data, it will be difficult to make a 
distinction between those two activities. When the creation and processing of the data 
are inseparable, the protection of the Directive accrues because this activity falls 
within the term "obtaining". At the time of this post-script, the judgments of the ECJ 
are still awaited. 
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